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Abstract: This paper considers the impact of Stuxnet on cyber-attacks and cyber-defense. 
It first reviews trends in cyber-weapons and how Stuxnet fits into these trends. Because 
Stuxnet targeted an industrial control system in order to wreak physical damage, the focus 
is on weapons that target systems of that type and produce physical effects. The paper then 
examines the impact of Stuxnet on various domains of action where cyber-attacks play a 
role, including state-level conflict, terrorism, activism, crime, and pranks. For each domain, 
it considers the potential for new types of cyber-attacks, especially attacks against 
industrial control systems, and whether such attacks would be consistent with other trends 
in the domain. Finally, the paper considers the impact of Stuxnet on cyber-defense. 
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1. Introduction 
In fall 2010, not long after initial reports of Stuxnet hit the press, I began seeing headlines and 
stories declaring Stuxnet a game changer. In an article titled ―STUXNET—Game Changer,‖ Kevin 
Coleman, cyber-warfare correspondent for Defense Tech, said it represented a ―threshold level event‖ 
and ―new model of reality‖ [1]. The head of the Cybersecurity Center at the US Department of 
Homeland Security told Congress that it was a ―game changer‖ [2], while the European Network and 
Information Security Agency characterized it as ―a game changer for malware defence‖ [3].  
But if Stuxnet was a game changer, what changed?  
Like other computer worms, Stuxnet spread indiscriminately from one vulnerable computer to the 
next. What set it apart from the thousands of other worms that went before it is that it was designed to 
unleash its payload only when it entered an industrial control system (ICS) matching the characteristics 
of Iran‘s nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz. And when it did, it tampered with the code of the 
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programmable logic controller (PLC) used to control the centrifuges at Natanz, ultimately destroying 
about a thousand centrifuges and disrupting Iran‘s nuclear program [4,5]. No previously reported 
worm had done anything like that before, either in terms of precision targeting or causing physical 
damage through ICS manipulation.  
Is Stuxnet a forefather of future cyber-weapons? Will we soon see a rash of attacks against ICS 
components and devices, which include Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, 
as well as PLCs? These systems are used, for instance, to operate electric power grids, distribute oil 
and gas, and control water treatment systems and dams. Are they adequately protected against  
cyber-attacks? Will we witness cyber-attacks that go beyond the usual data theft and service disruption 
in order to cause serious physical damage against specific targets? Will cyber-terrorists use Stuxnet-like 
tools to cause nuclear explosions, shut down power grids, blow up gas lines, cause floods, or otherwise 
wreak havoc? 
According to The New York Times, Stuxnet was developed and deployed by the United States and 
Israel [5,6]. Does this mean that cyber-attacks have become an instrument of national power, 
augmenting other forms of national power, especially military power? Is Stuxnet a sign that cyber-warfare 
is already here or on the brink? Did Stuxnet‘s exposure and analysis bring cyber-warfare from the 
closed world of spies and covert operations into the public sphere? 
This article addresses these and other questions in order to determine how Stuxnet has changed the 
ongoing game of cyber-attack vs. cyber-defense. The approach is contextual, taking into account how 
Stuxnet fits into or alters cyber-related trends.  
The paper first reviews trends in cyber-weapons. Because Stuxnet targeted an ICS in order to wreak 
physical damage, focus is on weapons that manipulate systems of that type and produce physical 
effects. The paper then examines how Stuxnet impacts various domains of action where cyber-attacks 
play a role, including state-level conflict, terrorism, activism, crime, and pranks. For each domain, it 
considers the potential for new types of cyber-attacks, especially attacks against an ICS, and whether 
such attacks would be consistent with other trends in the domain. Finally, the paper considers the 
effect of Stuxnet on cyber-defense. 
2. Cyber-Weapons 
To appreciate the impact of Stuxnet on the development of destructive ICS cyber-weapons, it is 
necessary to look at what ICS weapons had already been developed and deployed. If Stuxnet were 
merely an incremental improvement over previous weapons, it would not qualify as a game changer in 
this area. 
Prior to Stuxnet, the most sophisticated and damaging cyber-attack against an ICS was commonly 
regarded as the months-long attack launched by Vitek Boden against the Maroochy Shire Council 
sewerage control system in Queensland, Australia in 2000. A former employee of the contracting 
company that developed the system, the 48-year-old Australian used equipment and software he had 
taken from the company in order access the ICS network and alter data. His attack caused pumps to 
malfunction and alarms to turn off, resulting in raw sewage overflows that killed marine life and 
harmed the environment [7]. 




While not to diminish the seriousness of Boden‘s attack, it was nonetheless considerably less 
sophisticated than Stuxnet in at least three areas: access, command and control, and stealth. With 
respect to access, because the network controlling the centrifuges at Natanz was not remotely 
accessible or even connected to the Internet, Stuxnet was deployed in the form of a complex computer 
worm that spread across Microsoft Windows machines via USB memory sticks and local network 
links, exploiting several unknown (―zero-day‖) vulnerabilities in the systems it hit and using fraudulent 
digital certificates to trick the systems into running its code [4]. As it spread, it had to examine the 
hardware, software, and settings of each system to determine if they matched those at Natanz, 
unleashing its payload only when they did. By contrast, Boden‘s equipment gave him immediate and 
direct access to his target.  
Second, with respect to command and control, Stuxnet needed to operate autonomously, with its 
commands and data wired into the code, although it also had the capability to receive new code over 
the Internet if so connected. Boden, on the other hand, was able to issue commands directly from a 
laptop, without the need to preprogram his entire operation. Thus, while Stuxnet‘s authors needed to 
get it right the first time, Boden had the opportunity to try things out and adjust his tactics. Further, 
whereas much of Stuxnet‘s code had to be developed from scratch and carefully crafted so as to 
recognize its intended target, Boden was able to use code he had taken from the contracting company 
and apply it directly against his target.  
Third, with respect to stealth, Stuxnet needed to conceal its presence long enough to cause the 
desired damage. It did this by hiding its code and effects, leading network operators at Natanz to 
believe that the centrifuges were operating normally, even as they were being manipulated in harmful 
ways. Boden, by contrast, did little to hide his actions. Operators monitoring the network were aware 
of the problems he was causing, but initially did not know their source.  
There have been reports of cyber-attacks affecting other ICS devices, including those operating 
electric power grids, but I have not seen any information suggesting that any of these attacks was at the 
level of Stuxnet. At Idaho National Labs, researchers demonstrated how a cyber-attack could cause a 
power generator to self-destruct [8], but neither code nor details were released, making it difficult to 
compare with Stuxnet. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the code would have been as complex as 
Stuxnet, as it did not have to spread, recognize its target, or hide its presence and effects over an 
extended period of time. Thus, it seems reasonable to say that Stuxnet represented a considerable 
advance over previous cyber-attacks or demonstrations against ICSs. As a cyber-weapon, it was a 
major innovation. 
Still, for Stuxnet to be a game changer, it has to make a noticeable mark on the future. This might 
happen through two avenues. First, the authors of Stuxnet, seeing its success and having developed 
knowledge, skills, and tools for attacking a complex ICS, could build on their work in order to develop 
and deploy new cyber-weapons against control systems. Indeed, this outcome seems likely. Stuxnet 
provided not only a means of disrupting Iran‘s nuclear program, but an investment in the future and 
building block for future cyber-attacks against ICS devices. Moreover, Stuxnet seems to be but one of 
several tools developed by the United States and Israel. Another computer worm, nicknamed Flame, 
reportedly contains some of Stuxnet‘s code, although it was used to secretly map and monitor Iranian 
networks rather than cause damage [9]. A third worm, Duqu, which was also used for information 




collection rather than sabotage, was said to be ―nearly identical to Stuxnet, but with a completely 
different purpose‖ [10] and possibly built on the same platform [11].  
Second, observers of Stuxnet‘s success could be inspired to develop similar cyber-weapons of their 
own. They might do this in order to attack a particular ICS device in support of a specific goal, or 
simply to keep up with what they see is a ―cyber-arms race.‖ This avenue also seems likely, in part 
because humans are naturally competitive and inclined to borrow useful ideas and techniques from 
others, but also because Stuxnet is now ―out there‖—at least its object code is available. Although its 
source code was not released, analysts have been able to decompile or reverse engineer the object code 
to discern Stuxnet‘s functionality, making it easier to develop new cyber-attack tools against control 
systems. Code developers need not start from scratch. 
Besides studying Stuxnet, security researchers have been independently examining ICS security, the 
objective being to identify vulnerabilities that could be exploited. Ideally, product manufacturers 
would release patches (fixes) for the vulnerabilities, which customers would then install, rendering any 
cyber-weapons that attempted to exploit them ineffective. In practice, however, vulnerabilities are not 
always fixed or patches installed, and exploit software is developed to take advantage of them. 
Researchers often develop these exploits to underscore the seriousness of the problem, push vendors 
into fixing them, and provide a mechanism for testing whether a particular system is vulnerable. But 
once published, the exploit code can also be used to facilitate harmful cyber-attacks. 
I started seeing reports of ICS vulnerabilities in 2007 and the release of exploits a few years later. In 
March 2011, the Moscow security firm Gleg announced the availability of Agora SCADA+, a package 
with 22 exploits, including exploits for 11 ―zero-day‖ vulnerabilities. Six days later, security 
researcher Luigi Auriemma released proof-of-concept exploit code against 34 SCADA vulnerabilities 
in software from four vendors [12]. Then in January 2012, researchers released information describing 
security flaws in widely-used PLCs from five vendors [13]. They provided exploit code for some of 
the flaws in the popular Metasploit framework, making it easier for security professionals to test their 
systems for the vulnerabilities—or their adversaries to attack them. Additional tools can be used to 
find Internet-connected ICS devices, which might then be attacked. Using the Shodan search facility, 
for example, Éireann Leveritt found 7500 such devices. By fusing this data with exploit information 
from Metasploit and ExploitDB plus geolocation data, he showed how someone could identify ICS 
devices vulnerable to a cyber-attack [14].  
Software developers often build on the work of others, and this general principle applies to the 
development of cyber-attack code. Most viruses, worms, Trojans, and other types of malware are not 
developed from scratch. Rather, existing code is modified and extended in order to produce a new 
version that evades detection, takes advantage of new vulnerabilities, produces a different effect, uses a 
different command and control channel, or puts the author‘s personal touch on the code. The 
emergence of cyber-weapons and exploits against ICS devices is thus likely to lead to the development 
of further cyber weapons against such targets, with Stuxnet offering one example. In this sense, 
Stuxnet might be regarded as just another data point on an ICS cyber-weapons curve that plots 
weapons capabilities over time. However, it likely accelerated the curve‘s rise, as it is more complex 
than other available ICS tools, and it drew considerable interest and study.  
If, as I have conjectured, Stuxnet influences the development of ICS cyber-weapons, how might 
those weapons be used? The next five sections each examine a domain of action where cyber-attacks 




play a role: state-level conflict, terrorism, activism, crime, and pranks. For each domain, Stuxnet‘s 
impact is examined in the context of existing trends in the domain. 
3. State-Level Cyber Conflict  
As already noted, Stuxnet was reportedly developed and deployed by the United States and  
Israel [5,6]. The apparent objective was to do more than just destroy some centrifuges. It was to slow 
down Iran‘s nuclear program. In that regard, Stuxnet achieved a national security goal that might 
otherwise have been met with a kinetic attack such as bombing the Natanz facility. But it did so 
without killing or injuring anyone, destroying anything other than centrifuges, or risking the lives of 
military personnel delivering bombs. By causing less harm to its target and incurring less risk for its 
perpetrators, it may have provided a morally better approach than its kinetic alternative, although its 
collateral effect of infecting about a hundred thousand computers worldwide would also need to be 
considered. In any case, I am not arguing that the operation was ethical, only that it may have been a 
more ethical means of destroying centrifuges than bombs would have been [15].   
Only a handful of cyber-attacks have been publicly attributed to nation-states. In 1982, the United 
States is said to have planted a Trojan horse in Canadian software that was used by the Soviets to 
control their Trans-Siberian gas pipeline. The effect was a massive explosion on a remote area of the 
pipeline [16]. Then in 2003, just before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the US penetrated the Iraqi Defense 
Ministry e-mail system, injecting messages telling Iraqi officials that the US did not wish to harm them 
and asking them to not resist the coming invasion ([17], pp. 9–10). 
Israel is said to have used cyber-weapons to blind Syria‘s air defenses at the time of its airstrike 
against a Syrian nuclear weapons facility in 2007. Nothing was damaged or destroyed, but the cyber-attack 
had the effect of hiding the Israeli aircraft from Syrians who were monitoring their airspace ([17], pp. 1–8). 
Like Stuxnet, the cyber-attack offered a morally better choice than, say, a kinetic attack that physically 
damaged Syrian‘s air defenses. 
When at war, nations often launch destructive military strikes, including strikes against the critical 
infrastructures of their adversary. During the opening moments of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, a 
US fighter plane directed a precision-guided bomb straight down the air-conditioning shaft of the Iraqi 
telephone system in downtown Bagdad, taking out the entire underground coaxial cable system and the 
primary means of communicating between the Iraqi high command in Baghdad and subordinates in the 
field [18]. What Stuxnet and the above instances of nation-state cyber-attacks illustrate is the 
possibility of meeting national security objectives with bits rather than bombs. In so doing, operations 
may be less expensive, less deadly, less destructive, and less risky to their perpetrators. Instead of 
dropping a bomb into a Baghdad communication facility, the US might have been able to temporarily 
disable Iraqi military communications with a well-crafted cyber-weapon. Stuxnet showed just how 
sophisticated and precise such cyber-weapons can be. It was dramatically different from the weapons 
used in the other instances, offering new possibilities for achieving military objectives. 
To the extent that cyber-weapons offer a less costly but morally preferred means of achieving 
national objectives over kinetic strikes, nation-states may find them an attractive alternative. Cyber 
weapons might be used to disrupt activity at other facilities believed to be involved in the production 
of weapons of mass destruction. During military operations, they might be deployed to temporarily 




disable power, communications, transportation, or other services, allowing the rapid restoration of such 
services once hostilities end, and thereby avoiding the costs and problems associated with post-conflict 
reconstruction. Stuxnet showed what is possible against an ICS, while providing a blueprint for attacks 
against nuclear enrichment facilities. Of course, just because a cyber-weapon employs bits rather than 
bombs does not mean that it cannot cause serious damage, including deadly explosions. In determining 
whether a particular cyber-weapon offers a moral advantage over a kinetic one, all effects must  
be considered. 
Although reports of state-level cyber-attacks have been few and far between, states are frequently 
accused of penetrating each other‘s networks in order to steal government and commercial secrets. 
State-level espionage has always been considered fair game, even during peacetime, and cyberspace 
has proven to be an easy and effective means for collecting information. China alone has been blamed 
for numerous instances of snooping against US and international targets since 2003, including 
incidents dubbed Titan Rain, Byzantine Hades, GhostNet, Shadows, Aurora, Night Dragon, Shady 
RAT, and Nitro. According to US intelligence agencies, most of the spying from China traces back to 
groups associated with China‘s People‘s Liberation Army [19]. Even earlier, Russia reportedly stole 
information from US Department of Defense networks beginning in the late 1990s in an incident 
named Moonlight Maze. 
Although cyber-espionage is not the same as cyber-attack, their technologies are not all that 
different, as both require mechanisms to penetrate systems, access information, control operations, and 
conceal activity and effects. Thus, any country with a cyber-espionage capability is likely to also have 
a cyber-attack capability. According to Admiral Mike McConnell, former Director of National 
Intelligence, most industrialized countries in the world today have these capabilities, at least to some 
degree. Other intelligence officials have suggested that the number of militaries with a ―respectable 
cyber war capability‖ is around twenty to thirty. Besides those I have already mentioned in this article, 
namely the US, Israel, China, and Russia, the list includes Taiwan, Iran, Australia, South Korea, India, 
Pakistan, and several NATO states, to include France [17, p. 64].  
Whether Stuxnet has affected these cyber-warfare capabilities is hard to say. Governments had been 
developing them independent of Stuxnet. Still, Stuxnet represented an advanced cyber-attack against 
the ICS of another state. Given its exposure, it may influence the types of cyber-weapons that states 
develop and accelerate a state-level cyber-arms race. It is not surprising that Iran was reportedly 
investing $1 billion to boost its offensive and defensive cyber-warfare capabilities after it had been hit 
by Stuxnet [20]. 
Stuxnet is frequently mentioned in academic and policy discussions about cyber-warfare and 
security, at both domestic and international levels. It that regard, it may have helped bring cyber-warfare 
from ―the shadows of the clandestine world into the limelight,‖ as Coleman opined [1]. Although 
cyber-warfare had been the subject of discussion well-before the Stuxnet attack, Stuxnet provided an 
actual incident, allowing the discussions to move beyond the hypothetical scenarios normally 
employed to a concrete example that had been experienced and documented. In so doing, it could help 
advance our understanding of how the law of armed conflict (LOAC) applies to cyberspace. While 
some might argue that Stuxnet represents a ―use of force‖ in violation of Article 2(4) of the United 
Nations Charter, others might view Stuxnet as something less than force or as a reasonable use of force 
against the threat posed by Iran‘s nuclear program under Article 51. For those in the latter camp, 




Stuxnet becomes not only permissible under LOAC, but morally preferred over a kinetic strike, at least 
if its collateral effects are ignored. By providing a specific cyber-weapon and context for its 
deployment, Stuxnet lets us not only examine the application of LOAC, but also see how a cyber-attack 
can potentially offer a kinder and gentler means of achieving a just objective than through the 
application of traditional force. 
4. Cyber-Terrorism  
I have been writing about the prospects of cyber-terrorism since the late 1990s, always coming to 
the conclusion that it was not yet here, but leaving open the possibility that we would see it in the 
future and acknowledging that cyber-threats overall were serious, growing, and in need of being 
addressed. In my most recent article, a follow-up to one I had written right after al-Qaeda‘s  
11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, I wrote: ―Thus, the decade following 9.11 closes in much the same 
state as it began. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups still prefer bombs to bytes, and cyber terrorism 
remains a hypothetical threat even as the overall threat level in cyberspace has increased‖ [21]. 
This does not mean that terrorists and jihadists aligning themselves with al-Qaeda have never 
conducted a cyber-attack. Indeed, they have defaced and conducted low-level denial-of-service (DOS) 
attacks against websites they believe are harmful to Islam. But none of these attacks has risen to the 
level of cyber-terrorism. For a politically-motivated cyber-attack to be considered an act of cyber-terror, it 
would have to be serious enough to actually incite terror on a par with violent, physical acts of 
terrorism such as bombings. Attacks that caused major blackouts, gas pipeline explosions, train 
derailments, plane crashes, large financial losses, and the like would fall in that category. Attacks that 
merely disrupt access to a public website do not. 
In another paper, I offered three indictors that might precede a successful incident of  
cyber-terrorism [22]: 
 Failed cyber-attacks against critical infrastructures, particularly the ICS devices that are used to 
monitor and control these infrastructures. I thought it unlikely that a first attempt would 
succeed with the desired effect, given the novelty of such an attack and uncertainty about how 
it would play out. Stuxnet might be considered an exception to this, but terrorists would not 
have the capabilities and resources of nation-states such as Israel and the United States, and 
thus more difficulty getting it right the first time. Even their kinetic attacks frequently fail. 
 Research and training labs, where terrorists simulate the effects of cyber-attacks against critical 
infrastructures, develop methods and tools to attack ICSs, and train people on how to conduct 
such attacks. I reasoned that it is hard to perform controlled experiments and analyze the 
consequences without a lab, as Israel appeared to have had for Stuxnet at their Dimona 
complex. Absent special facilities, I expected to at least see training materials showing 
terrorists how to conduct damaging attacks against ICSs and software tools designed to 
facilitate such attacks. 
 Extensive discussions and planning relating to acts of cyber-terror against critical 
infrastructures, not just attacks against websites and attacks aimed at making money. 




When Stuxnet came along, at least one jihadist took notice. A posting to the popular al-Shamukh 
jihadist forum in late 2010 called for attacks against SCADA systems, claiming they could be used to 
cause a massive explosion in a power plant, even a nuclear one, among other things. However, while 
giving a broad overview of SCADA systems and pointing to Stuxnet, the Australian sewage overflows, 
and other incidents affecting critical infrastructures, the posting offered no details for executing such 
attacks. Further, the premier jihadist English-language publication, Inspire, which has published nine 
issues as of May 2012, has focused exclusively on physical acts of violence. Readers can learn how to 
―make a bomb in the kitchen of your mom,‖ but not how to conduct even rudimentary cyber-attacks.  
Although jihadist websites and forums have offered tutorials and tools for rudimentary hacking, I 
have not seen jihadist materials for specifically attacking an ICS or any information suggesting that 
jihadists have access to a lab with ICS equipment and software, or that they have even attempted 
cyber-attacks against an ICS. The existence of Stuxnet, recognition of the potential damage that  
cyber-weapons such as Stuxnet could cause, and the availability of exploit tools against ICSs may 
bring us a bit closer to a cyber-terrorist incident than we were before Stuxnet, but the threat does not  
seem imminent. 
5. Cyber-Activism 
Cyber-activism refers to the use of cyberspace to promote some cause. It includes the development 
and use of cyber-tools that that support online actions such as e-petitions and e-mail writing campaigns, 
facilitate the organization and coordination of offline activities such as street demonstrations and 
marches, and help persons evade government censorship and surveillance while using the Internet. It 
also includes the development and use of cyber-attack tools for protesting the actions of governments 
and corporations. Cyber-activism is sometimes referred to as hacktivism, as it lies at the intersection of 
hacking (writing software or conducting cyber-attacks) and activism. While most cyber-activists would 
have no interest in a destructive tool like Stuxnet, a few might find it of value. 
To the best of my knowledge, no hacktivist group has conducted a cyber-attack against an ICS. 
Rather, those who deploy cyber-attacks have resorted primarily to web defacements and DOS attacks. 
They either post their grievances and demands on the hacked websites of their opponents, or else they 
bombard the sites with so much network traffic that legitimate access to the sites becomes difficult to 
impossible. The cyber-attacks launched by patriotic Russian hackers against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia 
in 2008 illustrate [17, pp. 11–21], as do many of those conducted by the collective named Anonymous.  
Some hacktivists have gone beyond web defacements and DOS attacks, however, compromising 
and disclosing sensitive documents, e-mails, and personal data, including passwords and credit card 
numbers. For example Anonymous, together with various groups linked to it such as LulzSec, has 
exposed the poorly secured systems of numerous agencies and corporations, and in so doing released 
sensitive, embarrassing, and personal information. They have put people at risk of identity theft, fraud, 
and other criminal acts. They also threatened a DOS attack against the Internet‘s root name servers, 
although the attack either did not take place or else had no noticeable effect [23]. According to the 
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), Anonymous has expressed 
an interest in targeting ICSs, but they have not yet demonstrated a capability to inflict damage on  
such systems [24]. 




Given the apparent interest of Anonymous (and perhaps other hacktivists), the possibility of 
hacktivists targeting an ICS cannot be ruled out. Further, a survey of 353 students at a Midwestern 
university in the United States found that a small percentage would be willing to conduct a cyber-attack 
that compromised a regional electric power grid, causing a temporary blackout, or a nuclear power 
plant, causing a release of radioactivity. In particular, 1.68% said they thought it would be appropriate 
to compromise a regional grid in their own country if their government engaged in harmful and unjust 
activities, while 3.08% said they would be willing to attack a grid in a foreign country that had harmed 
their homeland. A smaller percentage said they thought it would be appropriate to compromise a 
nuclear power plant, with 0.84% willing to attack one in their own country and 0.28% willing to attack 
one in a foreign country. A much larger percentage supported defacing a politician‘s or government 
website in their homeland (25.21%) or foreign country (22.40%), and still larger percentage supported 
posting something on Facebook (77.31% and 76.19%) [25]. 
In addition to attacking an ICS to protest the actions of one‘s own or a foreign government, 
hacktivists might attack an ICS in order to protest the nature of the facilities using the ICS. A group 
opposed to the continued use of fossil fuels, for example, might conduct a cyber-attack against an ICS 
in order to temporarily disrupt the processing or distribution of such fuels. If hacktivists do target ICSs, 
then Stuxnet, together with other ICS-related exploit tools, might prove to be a game changer in this 
domain. Still, most hacktivists could stay clear of ICS attacks out of concern for harming people or  
the environment.  
6. Cyber-Crime  
Cyber-attacks in the criminal domain are generally motivated by money or the desire for revenge. 
Those motivated by money usually do so through fraud, industrial espionage, and extortion. Fraud-related 
crimes include financial fraud, identity theft, and theft of services. They are facilitated by cyber-attacks 
that penetrate systems, steal financial account data such as bank and credit-card numbers, impersonate 
account holders, and alter accounts and usage information. Because ICSs are not used to control the 
flow of money or to manage accounts, cyber-attacks are not likely to be conducted against ICSs for the 
purpose of financial fraud or identity theft. However, they might be used to alter the usage information 
reported by sensors, for example, in order to hide the consumption of resources such as electricity, gas, 
or water. According to an FBI cyber intelligence bulletin, one US electric utility lost hundreds of 
millions of dollars because of cyber-attacks against their smart meters, and low-cost tools and software 
for tampering with the meters were readily available on the Internet [26]. However, the software bears 
no resemblance to Stuxnet, so Stuxnet may have little or no impact in this area. 
In the area of industrial espionage, criminals might be interested in penetrating ICSs in order to steal 
their codes and develop competing products. Stuxnet or Duqu would offer a starting point for 
operations of this type. However, it is probably easier to acquire the codes by hacking the business 
networks of the vendors or by reverse-engineering their products, so again Stuxnet may have little or 
no impact here. 
With respect to extortion, cyber-criminals frequently use cyber-attacks, especially DOS attacks, in 
order to extort money from a target, threatening to continue the attacks if the target does not pay up. If 
they successfully penetrate a target‘s networks and find sensitive information, they might instead 




threaten to expose the information if not paid. The security firm McAfee reported that 25% of the 200 
industry executives they surveyed in sectors using ICSs (electricity, oil/gas, and water) had experienced 
extortion attempts in 2010 [27]. The report does not say whether these involved cyber-attacks against an 
ICS or, more likely, a company‘s business network, but the former would be facilitated with a tool like 
Stuxnet because of its potential to cause considerable physical damage. Still, extortionists are primarily 
interested in making money, not developing software, so may prefer the simpler methods they have 
been using than to invest in a Stuxnet-like tool that is more complex and unlikely to work against as 
many targets. 
Some cyber-attacks are simply acts of sabotage, usually motivated by revenge. Typically, these are 
conducted by ―disgruntled‖ insiders, or former insiders, who are angry about how they have been 
treated. Boden‘s attack against the Maroochy Shire Council sewerage control system was of this nature. 
Like Boden, insiders can sabotage systems with tools considerably less sophisticated than Stuxnet, 
although a more sophisticated attack cannot be ruled out. 
7. Cyber-Pranks  
The domain I call ―pranks‖ refers to cyber-attacks that are conducted more for personal gratification 
and amusement than anything else. Unlike the domains of terrorism and activism, which serve some 
cause, and the domain of crime, which is driven by money and revenge, the domain of pranks is driven 
by excitement, curiosity, challenge, and ego. Persons who conduct cyber-attacks in this domain want 
to have fun, experiment, and impress others. Zone-h, which recorded about 1.4 million web 
defacements in 2010, reported that over half were conducted ―just for fun‖ and over 20% to ―be best 
defacer‖ [28]. The remaining reasons, which included patriotism, politics, revenge, and challenge, each 
accounted for less than 10%. 
In addition to defacing websites, hackers operating in this domain launch computer viruses and 
worms, break into systems, and conduct DOS attacks, among other things. Some of their cyber-attacks 
have affected ICSs, even if they did not attack them directly. The Slammer worm, for example, which 
infected up to 200,000 computers running unpatched Microsoft SQL software in early 2003, had the 
side effect of disabling a nuclear power plant‘s safety monitoring system and disrupting 
communications on the control networks of several utilities. 
Like those who hack for a cause, most of those who hack for fun are probably not interested in 
shutting off power, causing pipeline explosions, or producing other harmful effects. However, there 
may be a small percentage with no qualms about such actions, even seeking them out. In 1999, a group 
calling itself ―Realm of Chaos‖ caused 28 power outages in northeastern Wisconsin [29]. And in 2008, 
a 14-year-old electronics ―genius‖ built an infrared device that gave him control over the Polish tram 
system. His actions caused four trains to derail and numerous injuries [30]. Hackers have also 
intentionally disrupted emergency 911 services, and Slammer had the additional side-effect of doing so 
as well. 
For those hackers who take pleasure in harming others, a tool derived from Stuxnet or other ICS 
exploits would offer an attractive possibility. But even those who are not so motivated might 
experiment with such a tool in order to see what it does and show off to their friends. In the process of 
fooling around, they could cause more damage than they anticipated or even knew was possible. Over 




time, Stuxnet and related ICS cyber-tools could lead to more harmful pranks than we have experienced 
so far, but it hasn‘t changed the game yet. 
8. Cyber-Defense  
Stuxnet damaged the centrifuges at Natanz by reprogramming the Siemens PLC that controlled 
them. To do that, it had to first compromise a Microsoft windows system, and then the Siemens 
WinCC/PCS 7 SCADA control software running on it. This was accomplished by exploiting several 
vulnerabilities, one of which was a hardcoded WinCC/SCADA password that had been posted on the 
Internet. Recently, the Rugged Operating System, which runs RuggedCom switches and servers on the 
communications networks of power grids and other critical infrastructures, was reported to have a 
similar backdoor with hardcoded password. In this case, the password used with a particular device 
was unique. However, if an adversary was able to acquire the device‘s MAC address, say through the 
Shodan search facility, then the password could be computed by plugging the MAC address into a Perl 
script [31]. 
To defend against the likes of Stuxnet and other ICS cyber-attacks, the operators and vendors of 
ICSs need to do better. There is no excuse in today‘s threat environment for posting passwords on the 
Internet or using ones that an adversary can easily determine.  
Given the extensive attention Stuxnet received in the press, including reports of vulnerabilities in 
the ICSs running critical infrastructures and the harm that could result from ICS cyber-attacks, Stuxnet 
could serve as a motivator to governments and industry worldwide to initiate or accelerate efforts to 
enhance infrastructure security. In the remainder of this section, I will focus on US efforts in ICS 
cyber-security and Stuxnet‘s impact on these efforts. I make no claims about Stuxnet‘s impact in other 
countries, especially Iran, where its effects were much more significant. 
Within the United States, the vulnerabilities of ICSs were recognized long before Stuxnet, with 
efforts to address them dating back to at least 1996 when President Clinton established the President‘s 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP). The commission‘s report, issued in 1997, 
led to the creation of several government offices and to industry-centered information sharing and 
analysis centers for promoting cyber and critical infrastructure security [32]. Since then, but also 
before Stuxnet was reported in the press, the US government took several additional steps to 
strengthen cyber-defenses, including: 
 Creation of the office of Cyber Security and Communications (CS & C) in the National 
Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). This office also includes the National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center (NCCIC) mentioned previously, the National Cyber Security Division, 
and the US-CERT. 
 Appointment of a cyber-security coordinator in the White House. 
 Issuance of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (NSSC) [33]. 
 Issuance of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) [34]. 
 Issuance of the Strategy for Securing Control Systems (SSCS) [35]. 
 Formation of US Cyber Command.  




While most of these initiatives go well beyond ICS security, they also recognize the problems in 
this area. The NSSC states that the security of digital control systems and SCADA systems is a 
national priority, and that DHS will work with other concerned agencies and the private sector to 
increase the security of these systems. The twelfth initiative of the CNCI explicitly addresses cyber-security 
for critical infrastructures, calling for an approach that ―builds on the existing and ongoing partnership 
between the Federal Government and public and private sector owners and operators of critical 
infrastructures and key resources.‖ And, of course, the SSCS is devoted entirely to control systems. It 
includes the establishment of the Industrial Control Systems Joint Working Group and an expanded 
ICS Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT). In addition to these initiatives, several legislative 
proposals to strengthen cyber-security were introduced prior to Stuxnet‘s public disclosure. 
Since Stuxnet, DHS issued the Blueprint for a Secure Cyber Future: The Cybersecurity Strategy for 
the Homeland Security Enterprise [36]. Released in November 2011, the Blueprint addresses two areas 
of concern: protecting critical infrastructures and strengthening cyber-ecosystems. Among its goals are 
to strengthen cyber-defenses for ICS/SCADA systems in order to protect against attacks that could 
harm the general public. However, it is difficult to assess the influence, if any, of Stuxnet on the 
Blueprint given the earlier efforts to strengthen cyber-security. The NSSC was issued in 2003, the 
CNCI in 2008 (as NSPD-54/HSPD-23 under the Bush administration) and again in 2009 (under the 
Obama administration), and the Strategy for Securing Control Systems (SSCS) in 2009. These all 
preceded the public disclosure of Stuxnet in July 2010. However, the case is not so straightforward, as 
some US government officials would have been aware of Stuxnet as early as 2009 if indeed the US 
was involved in the operation, as the malware appears to have infected Natanz that year [37]. Indeed, 
some would have been aware of the effort even earlier, as the impetus behind it reportedly goes back to 
2006 [6]. Still, the government‘s drive for greater ICS security was likely motivated more by a 
growing awareness of the threats and risks than by Stuxnet specifically. According to Mark 
Weatherford, deputy undersecretary for cybersecurity at NPPD, they were ―seeing a troubling increase 
in the threats and the vulnerabilities‖ associated with ICSs [38]. 
Since Stuxnet, there have also been several new legislative proposals addressing cyber-security. At 
least one of these, Senate bill S.2015, The Cybersecurity Act of 2012, has several provisions aimed at 
strengthening the cyber-security of critical infrastructures. But again, it is difficult to assess the 
influence of Stuxnet on the introduction of this bill, given the earlier attempts at legislation. For 
example, S.773, the Cybersecurity Act of 2009, also addressed critical infrastructure security. However, 
the details of the two bills vary, so Stuxnet—along with all the other cyber-security threats that 
occurred in the interim—may have had some impact on the 2012 bill. 
Even if Stuxnet has had little impact on the strategic direction of the US government‘s cyber-security 
program, it has impacted day-to-day operations. Testifying before the US House Committee on 
Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security 
Technologies on 16 March 2011, Philip Reitinger, then deputy undersecretary of NPPD, reported that 
his division had taken several steps to help combat the Stuxnet threat [39]. Among others, the NPPD‘s 
ICS-CERT had analyzed the Stuxnet code, briefed government and industry organizations about the 
threat, and issued several advisories and updates about detecting and mitigating the threat. Companies and 
individuals in the security field have taken similar steps to understand, publicize, and mitigate the threat.  




In addition to affecting day-to-day operations, Stuxnet has influenced the cyber-security 
conversation. It is frequently mentioned in news stories, presentations, reports, and articles relating to 
cyber-threats, legislation, and developments. I have cited it in other papers and discussed it in classes 
at NPS and in outside presentations. It has raised awareness of ICS cyber-threats and the dangers of 
worms and other forms of malware. It could further inspire the development of cyber-security 
requirements, standards, products, practices, and regulations. But these activities are not indicative of a 
game change so much as an already growing concern over cyber-threats, not only to control systems, 
but to all targets. 
9. Conclusions  
The following summarizes the impact of Stuxnet on cyber-attacks and cyber-defenses: 
 Cyber-weapons: Stuxnet will likely inspire, accelerate, and serve as a building block for the 
development of new cyber-weapons that target ICS devices. These weapons will also be 
influenced by the growing interest of the cyber-security research community in ICS security, 
which has led to recent releases of vulnerability information and exploit tools that can be 
used against ICS devices, but Stuxnet could push development towards more complex tools 
and effects. Some of these tools, like Stuxnet, could be precisely targeted. 
 Cyber-warfare: Stuxnet could be a forbearer of the way nation-states use cyber-warfare, 
offering militaries a weapon that may be morally superior to a kinetic one, such as a bomb, 
when it incurs less harm and risk than the kinetic weapon while achieving the same 
objective. Stuxnet has also influenced academic and policy discussions about cyber-warfare, 
in part by offering a case study based on an actual incident. 
 Cyber-terrorism: While terrorists have expressed some interest in Stuxnet-like attacks, they 
appear to lack the capabilities and resources to conduct them or other devastating cyber-attacks. 
At least in the near-term, Stuxnet has had little impact on cyber-terrorism, though it has been 
cited to draw attention to the threat. 
 Cyber-activism: Some hacktivists might use tools derived from Stuxnet or other ICS 
weapons to conduct a cyber-attack against an ICS, but most are likely to prefer tools that are 
simpler and less likely to physically harm persons or the environment.  
 Cyber-crime: Criminals might use Stuxnet-like weapons against an ICS in order to extort 
money from the owner or to sabotage it out of revenge, but most are likely to prefer simpler 
tools that offer a greater financial return on their efforts. 
 Cyber-pranks: Some hackers like to fool around with cyber-weapons, in some cases 
deploying them without regard for or an understanding of potential consequences. Weapons 
derived from Stuxnet or other ICS exploits could attract some of these hackers, who might 
cause serious harm in the process of trying them out. 
 Cyber-defense: At least in the US, the response to Stuxnet appears to be following general 
trends in this area, which include increased attention to ICS security, as well as cyber-security 
more generally. Stuxnet does not appear to have shifted the US cyber-defense strategy. 




Thus, Stuxnet‘s greatest impact may lie in the domains of cyber-weapons and cyber-warfare. It 
could be a prelude to a new class of cyber-weapons against ICS devices and to methods of achieving 
national security objectives that are less damaging and risky than kinetic strikes. 
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